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In the debate about how to interpret Violation-of-Expectation (VoE) based false-belief
experiments, it has been suggested that infants are predicting the actions of the agent
based on more or less sophisticated cognitive means. We present an alternative, more
parsimonious interpretation, exploring the possibility that the infants’ reactions are not
governed by rational expectation but rather of memory strength due to differences in
the allocation of cognitive resources earlier in the experiment. Speciﬁcally, it is argued
that (1) infants’ have a tendency to ﬁnd more interest in events that observed agents are
attending to as opposed to unattended events (“interest contagion”), (2) the object-location
conﬁgurations that result from such interesting events are remembered more strongly by
the infants, and (3) the VoE contrast arises as a consequence of the difference in memory
strength between more and less interesting object-location conﬁgurations. We discuss
two published experiments, one which we argue that our model can explain (Kovács et al.,
2010), and one which we argue cannot be readily explained by our model (Onishi and
Baillargeon, 2005).
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INTRODUCTION
In recent years a number of experiments have established that
infants successfully predict actions by people holding false beliefs
(for a review see Baillargeon et al., 2010). Several of these false-
belief tasks are based on violation-of-expectation (VoE) measures,
designed to tap participants’ surprise in response to unexpected
stimuli. A representative example is Onishi and Baillargeon’s
(2005) seminal false-belief study that examined 15-month-old
infants’ ability to predict an actor’s behavior on the basis of her
true or false-belief about a toy’s hiding place. They measured the
time during which the infants looked at speciﬁc events, taking
looking-time as an indicator of surprise. The events were con-
strued so that they were more or less expected from the infant’s
perspective, depending on whether the infant expected an agent
to act rationally according to her belief. Onishi and Baillargeon
(2005) found that when the actor searched for the object where
the actor had left it, the infants looked for a shorter time than
when the actor searched at the location to which the object
had moved in the agent’s absence. This was interpreted as the
infants’ expecting the agent to act according to her belief, show-
ing that infants at 15 months of age are sensitive to what other
people believe. Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) study sparked a
debate regarding the complexity of 15-month-olds understand-
ing of other minds. On some accounts, the infants may indeed
be predicting what the actor will do next, but basing their pre-
dictions on a weaker form of representation than that of another
person’s belief. Thus, Perner and Ruffman (2005) suggest that
infants form a behavior rule stating that “agents look for objects
where they last saw them,” and Apperly and Butterﬁll (2009) sug-
gest that infants approximate beliefs based on perceptual access.
On other accounts, the infants are not making predictions based
on past events, but their looking behavior is instead governed by
associations either between agents, objects, and locations (Perner
and Ruffman, 2005) or between locations, objects, and object
affordances (Bruin et al., 2011). However, it may not be opti-
mal to search for one single mechanism in order to explain
infants’ behaviors in these tasks. Many different mechanisms
may be at play concurrently in a speciﬁc situation, and over
the course of development they may interact and build on each
other.
Kovács et al. (2010) employed a paradigm similar to the one
employed by Onishi and Baillargeon (2005), in order to show
that 7-month-old infants were sensitive to situations to which an
agent previously had attended. Infants were presented with ani-
mated movies in which an agent (a blue smurf) was watching
a ball rolling in and out behind a barrier. After two habitua-
tion trials (Figure 1), in which the ball ended up behind the
occluding barrier and subsequently was revealed, each infant was
presented with one of two experimental movies (Figure 2). In
both movies the ball left the scene at the end; the conditions dif-
fered as to when the agent left the scene. In one condition, the
agent had seen the ball roll off the scene, in the other condi-
tion the agent had last seen the ball roll in behind the barrier.
Then, the barrier was lowered and revealed no ball, which was
consistent with the experimental trial in which the ball had disap-
peared in both of the conditions. However, from the habituation
trials the infants were nevertheless accustomed to seeing the ball
behind the occluder. The infants who had seen the ball disappear
in the agent’s absence (Figure 2A), such that the agent would still
“believe” the ball to be there, looked longer than the infants who
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FIGURE 1 | Infants were habituated to a movie with the depicted structure. The ball is thrown so that it passes and then hides behind the occluding wall
and is subsequently revealed, all in the agent’s presence. Each infant was shown this animation twice (Kovács et al., 2010, supporting online material).
FIGURE 2 |The two experimental conditions from Kovács et al. (2010;
experiment 5). In condition (A) the agent’s and the infant’s beliefs differ,
but this also renders the depicted event less interesting to the infant,
compared to condition (B). When the occluder is lowered in the last
panel, the infants in condition (B) will have a stronger memory of the
events, leading to shorter looking time compared to the infants in
condition (A). The condition names in parentheses are from Kovács et al.
(2010) paper.
had seen the ball disappear in the agent’s presence (Figure 2B).
This suggests, according to Kovács et al. (2010) that the agent’s
apparent false-belief that the ball would still be present behind
the occluder inﬂuenced the infant’s own belief about the ball.
Their experiment raises an important question about what the
looking-time response indicates. Does it show what the infant
expects the agent to do, or does it merely show that the infant is
sensitive to speciﬁc object-location conﬁgurations as opposed to
others?
A few studies have manipulated the agent’s presence indepen-
dently of the agent’s looking behavior, effectively ruling out a
simple association model based only on the presence of the agent,
at 13 months of age (Southgate et al., 2007) and at 18 months
(Senju et al., 2011). However, seeing implies another aspect that
so far has not been controlled for. We submit that in most
infant false-belief experiments, the fact that the agent perceives
or attends to a certain event increases the infant’s interest in
that event, so that the infant ﬁnds events attended to by others
more interesting. We dub this mechanism “interest contagion”,
because we hypothesize that (a) attention is a signal of inter-
est, (b) what others show interest in will also seem interesting
to an observer, and (c) the transfer of interest is involuntary or
mandatory and thus may be properly viewed as contagion. We
will argue that events found interesting by the infant give rise to
stronger memory of these events, something that in turn causes
differences in looking time responses in false-belief experiments.
For instance, a hiding event that the agent does not see is per-
ceived as less interesting, leaving the infant with a weaker memory
of the situation in which the object is at the hidden location, than
does an event that the agent sees. This difference in the infant’s
memory of speciﬁc situations is sufﬁcient to create the differ-
ence in looking time in the experiment by Kovács et al. (2010).
We will articulate our argument with respect to that experiment,
claiming that interest contagion can explain the data, and then
discuss whether interest contagion can inform the interpreta-
tion of other experiments such as that of Onishi and Baillargeon
(2005).
INTEREST CONTAGION IN FALSE BELIEF TASKS
By “interest contagion” we mean the tendency to ﬁnd interest in
what others attend to. Similarly to how “emotion contagion” is
deﬁned by Hatﬁeld et al. (1994) as “The tendency to automatically
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mimic and synchronize expressions, vocalizations, postures, and
movements with those of another person’s and, consequently, to
converge emotionally,” we deﬁne interest contagion as follows:
The tendency to automatically ﬁnd interest in events, situations, or
objects that others show interest in, as conveyed by behaviorally manifest
attention, and, consequently, to converge with respect to interest.
Extensive research on social aspects of attention (for a review
see Birmingham and Kingstone, 2009) has shown that we tend to
lookwhere other people look. Already infants as young as 6months
follow the gazeof others (Reid andStriano,2005). ERP results from
4-month-old infants suggest that objects upon which an adult had
previously gazed are detected as more familiar by the infants, com-
pared to objects that were not gazed at (Reid et al., 2004). Further
effects in the same vein have been shown in the context of joint
attention, both in 9-month-olds (Kopp and Lindenberger, 2011)
and in 4-month-olds (Kopp and Lindenberger, 2012). Interest
contagion need not be contingent on overt gaze: head direction is
cueing attention independently of gaze in a way that leads to slow-
ing of reaction times in adults when concurrent head and gaze cues
mismatch (Langton, 2000). One-year-olds ﬁnd interest in other-
wise uninteresting objects when adults act on them (Trevarthen
and Hubley, 1978), suggesting that interest is conveyed by a range
of goal-directed behaviors when the agent’s attention to the goal is
manifest.
Hence, interest contagion is a consequence of agents’ bodily
manifest attention. What agents attend to or do not attend to (or
see) is exactly what is modulated in the false-belief experiments.
These experiments are built up as narratives with few distractors
other than one or two agents and an object which subsequently
is moved around. Typically, the critical false-belief contrast is cre-
ated by letting an agent see some events involving the object while
failing to see other events1. The critical location change in the
false-belief condition goes unnoticed by the agent but the agent
sees the location change in the true-belief condition. Our hypoth-
esis is that the memory of the object at the ﬁnal location will
be stronger for an infant facing the true-belief condition than
for an infant experiencing the false-belief condition. A stronger
memory of a situation would render the situation less surpris-
ing to the infant, shortening the time during which the infant is
inclined to look in response to subsequent presentations of the
same situation. Thus, the difference in looking-time between the
conditions can be explained as a result of the infant’s sensitivity
to other agents’ attention. Hence, there is no need to assume that
the infant is viewing the agent as rational, acting on his or her
beliefs.
An agent’s action can be surprising if it is not rationally justi-
ﬁed by the perceived events, for example when an agent searches
for an object in a place where it is irrational for her to search.
However, surprise can also be an effect of pure frequency, since an
infrequent stimulus comes out as surprising in comparison with
more frequent stimuli. If the agent were to repeatedly interact
with an object at one of two locations, and then suddenly turn
to the other location, the new interaction would be more surpris-
ing. This contrast is employed in habituation experiments such as
1An exception from this observation is Song et al. (2008), in which the agent was
told about the location of the object.
those of Onishi and Baillargeon (2005) and Kovács et al. (2010,
experiments 4–7). Infants are habituated by being shown repeated
instances of a speciﬁc event (i.e., an object hiding at a speciﬁc
location), before being shown more or less expectable situations
based on the same pattern. For example, in two of Kovács et al.’s
experiments (2010, experiment 5 and 7), at ﬁrst the ball is repeat-
edly shown ending up behind the occluder and revealed when
the occluder is lowered. Then it is shown leaving the scene in a
subsequent experimental trial. In the test phaseduring whichthe
infant’s looking time is measured, the occluder is lowered and
shows an empty space, which corresponds to what you would
expect having seen the ball leave, but not to the previously habit-
uated state. This relative familiarity of the habituated situation
compared to the test situation is assumed to affect the look-
ing time, as the habituation logic behind the experiment makes
evident.
However, the mechanism behind the habituation is simply that
subsequent presentations of a speciﬁc situation strengthen the
perceiver’s memory of that situation. If different stimulus con-
ﬁgurations were equally common, the perceiver’s interest when
viewing the events would affect which stimulus would leave the
stronger memory, and consequently, which stimulus would be the
more surprising at subsequent presentations.
INTEREST CONTAGION APPLIED TO EXISTING
EXPERIMENTAL PARADIGMS
In Kovács et al.’s (2010) experiment number 5, all events were
equal in the two conditions, except for that the agent left at
different points in time in the different conditions. We explain
the results of the experiment as follows. In the critical false-
belief condition, the agent left before the ball rolled out from
behind the occluder and rolled off the scene. That the agent
left at that point rendered the agent’s belief false, and also made
the ball-leaving event less interesting from the perspective of the
infant. In the corresponding true-belief condition, the infant sees
the agent watch the ball roll off the scene, rendering the ball-
leaving event more interesting from the infant’s perspective. Since
interesting events cause stronger memories, the infants who saw
the agent watch the ball leave (the true-belief condition) were
left with a stronger memory of the ball’s leaving than infants
who witnessed the false-belief condition. Thus we expect that
the looking time in the test situation, in which the occluder is
lowered revealing no ball, will be shorter for the infants in the
true-belief condition than for the infants in the false-belief con-
dition. This is precisely what is found by Kovács et al. (2010,
experiment 5).
It is an open question if 7-month-old infants make predictions
based on representations of other peoples’ beliefs, rather than
merely reacting to their behavior without attributing a rational
structure to the events. Parsimony speaks in favor of our interpre-
tation of Kovács et al. (2010) experiment. Drawing on recognition
memory as the crucial cognitive mechanism, we avoid making
the assumption that infants’ predict what is going to happen next,
based on representations of past events. This distinguishes our
account from all forms of perceptual access accounts, whether they
build upon representing other’s beliefs (Baillargeon et al., 2010),
approximations of beliefs (Apperly and Butterﬁll, 2009), or what
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others previously have seen (Perner and Ruffman, 2005). These
accounts have in common that they suggest that infants base their
predictions on what is rational for the agent to do given his or her
past experience. Our account predicts that the infant will not be
sensitive to the presence of the agent in the test phase, since the
facilitatory effect of the agent occurs only in the phase in which the
to-be-tested association is formed. Indeed, this iswhatKovács et al.
(2010) ﬁnd in an adaptation of the described experiment, both in
adults (experiment 2) and in infants (experiment 7). Moreover,
this is not predicted by an association-based account along the
lines of Perner and Ruffman (2005), or by the affordance-based
account by Bruin et al. (2011). Since Kovács et al. (2010) ﬁnd their
effect regardless of whether the agent is present in the test phase or
not, clearly, their experiment does not provide evidence that the
participants’ reactions to the test event is dependent on the context
as given by the agent’s presence.
However, turning to Onishi and Baillargeon’s (2005) original
experiment, interest contagion alone cannot explain the infants’
looking behavior. In contrast to Kovács et al. (2010), Onishi and
Baillargeon (2005) used two hiding locations, which enabled them
to compare looking times to each location directly in the experi-
mental conditions. Thus, they were able to show that in some of
their conditions, the habituated location produced longer look-
ing times than the other location. Still they consistently found
that the infants looked less to searches in the locations where the
agent last saw or interacted with the object. Taken together, this
suggests that at 15 months, at the very least, infants (1) have a
robust sense of when the state of the world has changed, and so
can disregard the habituated location when the object has moved,
and (2) upon the agent’s return are able to disregard informa-
tion from situations other than the one associated with the agent.
From our perspective, an intriguing possibility is that what drives
the infants’ behavior also in this case is not the mere presence of
the agent, but rather the overt interest shown by the agent. Thus,
only an interested agent will be associated with the relevant sit-
uations and events memorized by the infant. This would also be
compatible with the results by Southgate et al. (2007) and Senju
et al. (2011), in which the agent never left the scene but failed to
see the critical event.
OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS
Finding decisive evidence in favor of one account of infant social
abilities over another has proven hard, mainly because of the
inherent confound of agents’ seeing, knowing and showing overt
(manifest) interest present in the experiments. Even if an exper-
iment would show that a non-social cue gives rise to the same
looking time pattern as a social cue, it would not be easy to show
that the mechanism was one and the same in both cases. In any
case, interest contagion is worth exploring in its own right. We
can identify at least three areas of inquiry emerging from the
hypothesis suggested here.
• Which aspects of an agent’s behavior convey interest robustly?
• Which types of agent-location conﬁgurations provide contexts
for remembering situations?
• When and how do infants become sensitive to such contexts, in
addition to being susceptible to interest contagion?
These questions canbe studiedbyparametrically varyingdiffer-
ent aspects of an agent’s overt interest independently of the agent’s
seeing, in experiments with a structure similar to the false-belief
tasks of Kovács et al. (2010) and Onishi and Baillargeon (2005),
respectively. Thus, the ﬁrst question can be evaluated by manip-
ulating the agent’s behavior in the ﬁrst phases of the experiment.
We predict that doing so would render the events leading up to the
ﬁnal location of the object more or less interesting to the observer,
creating differences in looking times or reaction times. When such
a paradigm is established, the agent’s behavior in the test phase can
be manipulated in order to explore under which circumstances the
context given by that behavior plays a role for the observer’s reac-
tions, addressing the second question. Finally, we may employ the
outlined paradigm with infants at different ages, framing how sen-
sitivity to the contextual effectsof other agents’ behavior develops
over time.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
We suggest that interest contagion as spelled out here may be a
constitutive part of an observer’s appreciation of other people’s
perception. As such, it is not a mere confounding factor due to
shortcomings of experimental design. Furthermore, the cogni-
tive effects of being interested in what others attend to or show
interest in may produce effects on infants’ looking times similar
to those found in VoE based false-belief experiments. The mech-
anism proposed here accounts for the results of Kovács et al.’s
(2010) false-belief experiment with 7-month-old infants. While
not explaining results from older infants, it suggests directions for
how to look for similar mechanisms for other VoE results, such as
those from Onishi and Baillargeon (2005). Our account of early
sensitivity to the perceptual history of other agents is minimal
and does not presuppose that infants construct a rational inter-
pretation of the perceived events. The underlying mechanism can
clearly act as a supporting mechanism in social cognition and
the understanding of social situations, as well as developmental
scaffolding for more elaborate sociocognitive abilities.
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